Results of a primary meta-analysis indicated a significant main effect o the organizational behavior modification (O.B. Mod.) approach on task performance (d. = .51; a 17 percent increase) and a significant treat ment-by-study interaction. To account for within-group heterogeneit of effect sizes, we conducted a two-level theory-driven moderator analysis by partitioning the sample of studies first into manufacturing and service groups and then into seven classes of reinforcement inter ventions. Results indicated a stronger average effect of O.B. Mod. in manufacturing organizations, moderation by the type of contingent interventions, and "pairwise" differences among average effect sizes in both organizational types. The practical implications of these findings for solving the challenge of improving performance without adding cos are discussed.
settings. Specifically, the model provides a five-step application framew for identifying, measuring, analyzing, contingently intervening in evaluating employees' task-related behaviors aimed at performance provement (Luthans & Kreitner, 1975 . Figure 1 and not-for-profit organizations and in Western and other cultures (e.g., Welsh, Luthans, & Sommer, 1993b) . The application of the O.B. Mod. approach has been shown to positively affect manufacturing productivity (e.g., Welsh et al., 1993a) , sales performance (e.g., Luthans, Paul, & Baker, 1981) , customer service (e.g., Luthans, Fox, & Davis, 1991) , absenteeism and tardiness (e.g., Kempen, 1982) , and safety (e.g., Haynes, Pine, & Fitch, 1982) .
Although there have been several conceptual reviews of behavioral management in general (e.g., O'Hara et al., 1985; Merwin, Thomason, & Sanford, 1989) , no study to date has quantitatively synthesized, tested, compared, and evaluated the variations in O.B. Mod. effect magnitudes across the available studies.
The overall purpose of this study was to meta-analytically aggregate an analyze the research findings pertaining to the O.B. Mod. approach to p formance improvement. Specifically, in a primary meta-analysis we inv tigated two research questions: (1) What is the average treatment effect fo O.B. Mod. on task performance? and (2) Are there any study characteristics that systematically moderate the relationship between O.B. Mod. and ta performance? Next, we summarized the conceptual evidence that guided ou choice of moderators and then tested the derived hypotheses in the moder tor analysis. The pairwise differences between moderator groups and amon moderator classes were also examined. Drawing on implications of our analysis, we conclude by suggesting new directions for future research and by providing several guidelines for practical applications in the field organizational behavior. PRIMARY 
META-ANALYSIS

Identification of the Studies
The collection of studies was initiated by computerized searches o specialized databases, such as the Business Periodicals Index, Psychlit, t Expanded Academic Index, Sociofile, the Social Science Index, and Disse tation Abstracts, covering the published literature from 1975 to 1995. key words used were organizational behavior modification, O.B. Mod., ganizational behavior management, behavior modification, and applied havior analysis. We manually searched for relevant articles that were covered by computerized databases in the following journals: the Acade of Management Journal, the Academy of Management Review, the Journa Organizational Behavior Management, the Journal of Applied Behavi Analysis, the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, the Journal of Applie Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Psychological Bulletin, Psychological Re view, and the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. We also co ducted searches using the reference sections of conceptual reviews an books on organizational behavior management (e.g., Andrasik, 1979 , 19 Bobb & Kopp, 1978 Luthans & Kreitner, 1975 Luthans & Martin 1987; Mayhew, Enyart, & Cone, 1979; Merwin et al., 1989; O'Hara et al., 1985; Rapp, Carstensen, & Prue, 1983) . In addition, unpublished manuscripts were solicited from a number of researchers in this field. The search was limited to articles in the English language.
Selection Criteria for Inclusion in the Analysis
Since the research on behavior modification has been conducted across various disciplines, we started by defining the boundaries of our work. Thi study is about the effects of O.B. Mod., as defined by Kreitner (1975, 1985) , on task performance in organizational settings. This definition places several limitations on the scope of the analysis.
First, to be included in this meta-analysis, a study was required to e amine dependent variables in the form of behavior-based task-performance measures. We focused on task performance because the reinforcement theory background and principles of behavior modification on which t O.B. Mod. model is based postulate that every behavior identified for chang must be: (1) observable, (2) measurable, (3) task-specific, and (4) perfo mance-related (Luthans & Kreitner, 1975 . Second, considering t overriding reinforcement theory assumption of O.B. Mod. that behavior is function of its contingent consequences (Luthans & Kreitner, 1975; Skinner 1966 Skinner , 1969 , a study was also required: (1) to demonstrate the use of one more empirically distinguishable dimensions of a reinforcement modali (e.g., money, feedback, social praise), (2) to have the reinforcement contingently administered (e.g., only upon identified behavioral responses), a (3) to operationalize reinforcement contingencies as an external intervention (e.g., by a manager or researcher). This definition thus excludes antecedents for behavioral control (e.g., job design), random reinforcement, and self generated rewards. Finally, a study was required to provide the minimu statistical information necessary to calculate effect sizes either directly or through mathematical transformations. If a report included several ind vidual experiments, the corresponding number of effect sizes was calculated and included in the analysis. Out of 125 studies that satisfied the searc criteria, 19 (15%) met the inclusion requirements: 14 published articles, book chapter, 1 dissertation, and 3 unpublished manuscripts. We calculat 115 effect sizes, based on a total sample size of 2,818 subjects. The avera sample size per effect was 25 subjects.
Effect-Size Estimation and Homogeneity Assumption
Calculating single effect sizes. Using the Hedges and Olkin (1985) metaanalytic method, we started the analysis by estimating the effect size for ea study in the form of index g, using Hedges's (1986) notational system.1 The effect size g represents the mean difference between an experimental and a control group divided by the pooled standard deviation assumed to be common to both groups. Since for small samples (n < 10), g has a slight tendency to overestimate population effect size 8 (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) , we multiplied g with the correction factor provided by Hedges (1981) , which gives an unbiased estimator (d). Hedges (1981) showed that the unbiased estimator d for every g has an approximately normal sampling distribution when all studies share a common effect size with the mean 8 and variance v, where v is determined by the sample sizes and the value of d (cf. Hedges, 1986) .
Combining estimates of effect sizes. Although one way to combine estimates of single effect sizes is to simply average the values of d, the more precise procedure is to combine them by calculating a weighted average effect size that incorporates variances vi to vk for each di to dk (Hedges, 1986) . Thus, to determine whether all studies shared the common effect size, we computed the weighted average effect size (d.) across k studies by weighting each effect size by the inverse of its variance. After determining the weighted average effect size (d.) and its variance (v.), we tested the hypothesis that the common population effect size 8 was equal to zero by comparing the ratio d.2/v.2 to the chi-square distribution for one degree of freedom. In other words, we intended to determine if there was a significant main effect for the average treatment across k studies.
Testing for homogeneity of effect sizes. (Hedges, 1982b; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) . However, significant heterogeneity of effect sizes across k studies indicates that differences in individual effect-size magnitudes may be large enough to cause rejection of the homogeneity hypothesis that single effect sizes are drawn from the same population (a significant treatment-by-study interaction; Hedges, 1986) . To test for treatment-by-study interaction, we used the Ht homogeneity statistic (Hedges, 1982a (Hedges, , 1986 , which represents the weighted sum of squares of the effect-size estimates di to dk about the weighted mean (d.).
Outlier Analysis
Exclusion of single-case studies. Considering that the O.B. Mod. model has theoretical roots in Skinner's operant conditioning paradigm, it was no surprise to find that several studies that satisfied the criteria for inclusion in this meta-analysis reported multiple case studies each involving only one subject (n = 1). Although we recognize the idiosyncratic value of these experiments (cf. Luthans & Davis, 1982) , we treated studies with one subject as sample-size outliers and excluded them from our study. (Light, Singer, & Willett, 1994) , which indicated outliers and extreme values for the entire sample of k studies. Effect sizes positioned 1.5 to 3 lengths from the upper or lower edge of the 50 percent interquartile range (e.g., Tukey's hinges) were considered outliers, and those placed more than three lengths from the interquartile range were considered extreme values (e.g., Tukey, 1977) . These limits corresponded to an effect-size value of 2.0, meaning that the average person in the control group would rise two standard deviations from the mean at the 98th percentile of the standard normal distribution after the treatment (cf. Glass, 1976) . Although only a modest proportion of all effect sizes was deleted (10%), we followed the customary procedure for dealing with sample-size outliers by conducting two analyses, combining effect sizes with outliers and extreme values in one and omitting outliers and extremes in the other (e.g., Williams & Livingstone, 1994) .
Results of the Primary Meta-Analysis
As indicated above, in combining the individual estimates of effect sizes to produce an overall estimate of effect magnitude d. for the entire set of k studies, we performed two analyses, one with (set 1) and one without (set 2) effect-size outliers and extreme values. For the first set of studies, the one including outliers and extreme values, the value of the average unbiased effect size d. was .95, with a variance v. of .0005. The magnitude of this average effect size indicated the presence of a significant main effect of treatment across the k studies (X21 = 1,536.33, p < .05). After removal of the outliers and extreme values in the second set of studies, the magnitude of the average unbiased effect size d. was .51, with a variance v. of .0006. The magnitude of this average effect size also indicated the presence of a significant main effect for treatment across the remaining k studies (X21 = 377.61, p < .05).
On the basis of the test for within-group homogeneity of effect sizes, we rejected the homogeneity assumption (Ht = 616.76, p < .05), which was as 2 First, since effect size g tends to slightly overestimate the population effect size 8 for small samples (n < 10), we based our analysis on the unbiased estimator d, which provides a more reliable estimate of effect magnitude. Applying the correction factor necessary to compute d (Hedges, 1981) reduces the magnitude of g in every instance of small sample size except when n = 1, in which case the correction factor actually inflates the value of the already positively biased estimator g. Second, the nomographs for exact confidence intervals for population effect size 8 when the lesser of ne or nC is less than 10 include the values for effect-size magnitude when 2 -n < 10 (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) , thus again excluding the possibility of n = 1. Third, when there are studies with sample-size outliers as extreme as n = 1, weighting the average effect-size estimate with the inverse of its variance will be unduly biased, considering the relatively greater sample estimate of variance based on single subjects. expected, given the diverse attributes of the studies included in this metaanalysis. This finding suggested that: (1) single effect-size magnitudes were not consistent among each other, (2) there was significant treatment-bystudy interaction, and, most importantly, (3) it was inappropriate to specify the predictive model by a single average estimate of effect size. Since significant heterogeneity of effect-size magnitudes was present, we engaged in a search for moderators by turning to theoretical explanations for potential sources of systematic variance among the examined studies.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF O.B. MOD.
Reinforcement Theory
The single most important theoretical foundation for the of the O.B. Mod. paradigm is operant learning or reinforceme ster & Skinner, 1957; Komaki, 1986; Skinner, 1966) . Larg Thorndike's (1913) law of effect, reinforcement theory f agents of human action in the functional relationship betwee tal variables (antecedents and consequences) and the behavi (Rogers & Skinner, 1956; Skinner, 1969) . The arrangement of conditions influences the behavioral response, and the kno relationship between behavior and its contingent conseque learning (Bandura, 1969) . Considering the overall effectivenes ment theory, Vroom noted that "without a doubt the law of ciple of reinforcement must be included among the most sub ings of experimental psychology and is at the same time a useful findings for an applied psychology concerned with con behavior" (1964: 13).
In the application of reinforcement theory to modification of the behavior of organizational participants, antecedents (e.g., job design, training) of a desired behavior should be analyzed first to determine what factors functionally cue or set the occasion for that behavior to be "emitted" (e.g., Komaki, Blood, & Holder, 1980) . However, antecedents assume stimulus control properties only in the presence of reinforcing contingent consequences, which in turn determine if a behavioral response will actually occur (e.g., Komaki, Collins, & Penn, 1982) . In fact, as Bandura pointed out, "If people acted ... on the basis of informative cues but remained unaffected by the results of their actions, they would be too insensible to survive very long" (1986: 228). Thus, identifying the reinforcing contingencies of the emitted behaviors is the critical process in the application of reinforcement theory to organizational settings.
Behavioral Systems Analysis
Considering its reinforcement theory background, the underlying assumption of O.B. Mod. is always the same: behavior is a function of its contingent consequences (Luthans & Kreitner, 1975 . However, although this principle serves as a general guideline for O.B. Mod. applicaOctober tions across organizational settings, sufficient conceptual and empirical evidence has been generated to prevent scholars and practitioners from "presuming that one set of contingencies will work equivalently well across varied organizations" (Suzler-Azaroff, Pollack, & Fleming, 1992: 117) . Mawhinney (1992) also argued that automatically applying one set of contingencies to distinct organizational settings would be a mistake since the extent to which certain behavioral interventions are effective depends on specific features of a particular organizational type.
The premise that the type of organization in which an application occurs may be causing differences in the effect magnitudes of O.B. Mod. is conceptually based upon behavioral systems analysis, which represents "a blend of behavior analysis and systems analysis perspectives in that the environment of interest for the behavioral systems analyst is generally a complex environment ... and the behavior of interest is that which is controlled by that organizational environment" (Krapfl & Gasparotto, 1982: 24) . In behavioral systems analysis, the network of operating reinforcers within an organization is examined to determine which application of various contingencies will be best supported by the organizational environment and which will be incongruent with the characteristics of the particular organizational type (Gilbert, 1978; Krapfl & Gasparotto, 1982) . Especially important in this type of analysis is identifying the reinforcers inherent in a particular organizational setting, since intervening with reinforcers that are readily available and already congruent with distinct organizational features increases the chances for successful behavioral change (Stokes & Baer, 1977) .
The combined characteristics of networks of reinforcing contingencies inherent to various organizational settings are assumed to be conceptually generalizable according to specific organizational types (Krapfl & Gasparotto, 1982; Luthans & Kreitner, 1985; Mawhinney, 1979 Mawhinney, , 1992 Mawhinney & Ford, 1977; Stokes & Baer, 1977; Suzler-Azaroff et al., 1992) . In particular, the analysis of the availability and effects of different networks of reinforcing contingencies on task performance has usually been placed within the framework of manufacturing and service organizations (e.g., Bowen, Chase, & Cummings, 1990; Collier, 1990; Connellan, 1978; Luthans, 1988; Luthans & Davis, 1990; Mirman, 1982; Quinn & Gagnon, 1986; Riddle, 1986; Schneider & Bowen, 1993; Wikoff, Anderson, & Crowell, 1982) . We next examine the specific features of manufacturing and service organizations that might cause systematic variations in the effect magnitudes of the O.B.
Mod. interventions studied here.
Manufacturing versus Service Organizations
In comparison to manufacturing organizations, where producti gains are mostly made through technological innovations (Quinn & Gagn 1986 ), service organizations are labor intensive, which poses special lenges in determining the most effective behavioral interventions (Hesk 1986). Summarized broadly, key organizational characteristics that cause differences in the effectiveness of various types of behavioral int ventions in manufacturing and service organizations are: (1) the definition and possibility for accurate assessment of performance outcomes and (2) the nature of the task-performance and work processes involved in the delivery of performance outcomes (Collier, 1990; Luthans & Davis, 1990; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985; Suzler-Azaroff et al., 1992; Wikoff et al., 1982; Williams & Zigli, 1987) . Definition and assessment of performance outcomes. The complex evaluation problems in service organizations are mostly related to the (1) conceptual definition of service as a performance outcome and (2) operationalization of those definitions by practicing managers. In manufacturing organizations, the emphasis is on the production or assembly of tangible goods (Wikoff et al., 1982) , but in service organizations, the emphasis is on service as the performance outcome (Parasuraman et al., 1985) . The major difference between the two performance outcomes is that goods can be easily described and directly measured, whereas service usually contains a set of intangible and implicit attributes that are hard to define in operational terms (Sasser, Olsen, & Wyckoff, 1978) . The amorphous nature of service as a performance outcome is exemplified in the following definition:
A service can be an idea, entertainment, information, knowledge, change in the customers' appearance or health, social innovation, circumstance (being at the right place at the right time), convenience, ... security, or any of a number of other things. Service may also be defined as a deed, a performance, a social event, or an effort and output that is consumed where it is produced (Collier, 1990: 237) .
Practicing managers in service organizations are also not immune from adding to the problem of clearly defining service as a performance outcome. In contrast to manufacturing organizations, where managers usually speak of performance outcomes in precise and operational terms (e.g., product specifications, how to measure quantity or quality), in service organizations managers often speak of service in vague generalities or fiery slogans, which usually falsely imply that employees know exactly what to do (Luthans & Davis, 1990) . For example, in a study examining the service behaviors of grocery store clerks, when the researchers asked the manager if he specifically outlined what he wanted employees to do, he replied that "they ought to know, since that was what they were getting paid to do" (Komaki, Waddell, & Pearce, 1977: 341) .
Williams and Zigli pointed out that "progress is being made in defining service and service ... parameters, but imprecision and manufacturing mentality make the task difficult " (1987: 14) . This difficulty persists because managers in service organizations must be able to at the same time (1) understand the specific characteristics of the service as a construct, (2) identify and quantify explicit and intricate implicit components of the service content, and above all (3) assess and develop representative measures of service as a performance outcome construct. Thus, whereas in manufacturing organizations performance outcomes tend to be specified in observable and mea-surable terms, performance outcomes in service organizations represent "an exciting challenge for management to quantify and measure ... and integrate these intangible measures with the tangible attributes of the service" (Collier, 1990: 242). Nature of the task-performance and work processes. Another difference between manufacturing and service organizations that may cause variations in the effects of behavioral interventions has to do with the accuracy of deciding what task performance to target for change (Riddle, 1986; SuzlerAzaroff et al., 1992) . This is because task performance in manufacturing and service organizations involves the use of different work processes to successfully accomplish performance outcomes. In particular, in manufacturing organizations tasks usually involve well-defined production processes (usually based on some form of predefined engineering specifications) that workers need to follow and, in addition, some form of automation is often present to simplify task performance (Quinn & Gagnon, 1986) . However, in service organizations tasks innately involve service delivery processes (Parasuraman et al., 1985) , which have characteristics quite different from those of production processes. Service delivery has to do with meeting or exceeding customers' expectations, which involves a complex web of dual perceptions, those of the managers and those of the customers (Luthans, 1988 (Luthans, , 1995 .
Thus, the critical difference between the two processes is that there are many more ways to misspecify what constitutes a service delivery process than a production process. As Schneider and Bowen pointed out, "Many services . . . are judged for quality based on seemingly tangential cues experienced during the delivery process" (1993: 39). One of the major problems that can cause the mismanagement of service delivery processes is discrepancy between customers' expectations and perceptions of service delivery (Parasuraman et al., 1985) . Specifically, if customers' perceptions of frontline service delivery do not match what they expected in terms of style or manner (Schneider & Bowen, 1993) , they may exhibit negative overt reactions, which can in turn have punishing consequences for service employees (Luthans, 1988; Luthans & Davis, 1990) . The possibility that such punishing consequences may "naturally" arise might cause service employees to assume that a job not well done will lead to negative contingencies and thus might attenuate the effects of originally applied behavioral interventions.
All these circumstances contribute to there being greater potential in service than in manufacturing organizations for the development of response patterns that might be incongruent with successful task performance. Thus, we hypothesize the following: As Bandura convincingly argued, "Human behavior ... cannot be fully understood without considering the regulatory influence of response consequences" (1986: 228). In fact, according to Bandura, that human behavior is influenced by its effects is not questioned in any theory that aspires to explanatory and predictive power. However, this does not imply that different reinforcing contingencies produce uniform effects, regardless of their content. Although not necessarily provided by a particular theory or stream of research, ample conceptual and empirical evidence suggests that different reinforcing contingencies may produce different effect magnitudes not only between groupings (as outlined above), but also within a particular grouping or classification, because of the differences in their unique reinforcing potential. In elaborating this premise, we largely drew from Bandura's (1986) conceptualization of the natures of different types of reinforcers and the related theoretical and empirical evidence (e.g., Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Komaki, Coombs, & Schepman, 1996; Luthans & Kreitner, 1975 . This literature suggests that different types of reinforcement are likely to produce different effects based on differences in (1) their reinforcement values, (2) their informative content and subsequent utility, and (3) the mechanisms through which they operate. On the basis of these distinct characteristics, the various reinforcers used in behavior modification in organizational settings can be classified into the following types of interventions:
(1) financial/monetary, (2) nonfinancial, (3) social, and (4) various combinations (simultaneous use) of two or more types of reinforcement.
Financial Reinforcement
The underlying characteristic of all financially based reinforcers is t organizations are directly or indirectly required to provide monetary tingencies. These usually include cash payments, although other fina rewards, such as prizes (commonly used in sales work), time off, and vacations have also been examined (see Merwin et al. [1989] for a review).
The common value of all financial reinforcers is derived from the fact that they ultimately lead to some form of tangible payoff (Bandura, 1986) particular, money becomes a reinforcer because it can be exchanged for ot desirable consequences (e.g., goods, services) or effects (e.g., privileges) (Ko maki et al., 1996) , whereas other financial consequences (e.g., prizes) reinforce because of the immediate benefits their contents provide. Anoth common characteristic (or better yet, deficiency) of financial reinforcers that they provide little specific information about a person's task perf mance. Besides generally indicating the direction of the performance come (e.g., "I must have performed well if I received the reward, or v versa") financial reinforcers neither (1) provide substantive insights ab the magnitude of the congruence or discrepancy between the level of performance outcome and the desired standard nor (2) supply any specific task-related information to guide subsequent performance efforts (cf. Andrasik, 1979 Andrasik, , 1989 O'Hara et al., 1985; Rapp et al., 1983) .
Considering the mechanisms through which they operate, the application effectiveness of financial reinforcers is largely enhanced if the following processes are recognized (cf. Bandura, 1986) . First, the more closely the incentives are tied to task performance based on individual merit, the greater the performance improvement (Lawler, 1971 (Lawler, , 1987 . Second, the merit-based individual performance must be measured objectively, since subjective performance evaluations can produce perceptions of inequitable rewards (Hammer, 1979) . Finally, if a group-incentive system is used, financial incentives that reward individual merit-based performance are more effective than equally allotted rewards (Farr, 1976) .
Nonfinancial Reinforcement
Nonfinancial reinforcers cost organizations little, if anything, to adm ister. Most of the behavioral interventions in this category can generally classified as objective or performance feedback (Kopelman, 1986; Luthans Kreitner, 1985) ; however, feedback information can be conveyed in a vari of different forms and ways (Ammons, 1956; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Kom et al., 1996) . In contrast to financial reinforcers, whose value is based on tangible payoffs their contents offer, feedback interventions derive their inforcing power from the information they provide about an emplo performance (Annett, 1969; Bandura, 1986; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Kom Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980) . Regardless of the source (e.g., supervis peers, task) or form (e.g., written, verbal) of feedback information, the ov riding guideline for application of feedback interventions under the Mod. approach is that feedback be (1) conveyed in a positive manner, immediate, (3) graphic, and (4) specific (Luthans, 1995) .
There is widely held agreement across the conceptual orientation (Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Locke & Latham, 1990 ) that feedback regulates human action by initiating the evaluation of and stimulating the reaction to a feedback-standard discrepancy (see Kluger & DeNisi [1996] for an extensive discussion and analysis of this topic). Although all of these theories agree on how people evaluate this discrepancy, they differ in their explanations of people's reaction to it. For example, according to control theory, when people perceive a negative discrepancy (after comparing a goal with feedback), they tend to reduce the gap either by changing their behaviors or the standard, or by "leaving the scene" cognitively or physically (Carver & Scheier, 1981) . However, according to goal-setting theory, the explanation of people's reaction to the discrepancy is that they are motivated to accomplish the goal, typically by increasing their effort (Locke & Latham, 1990 ).
According to social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) , much of human behavior is initiated and regulated by internal self-set standards and selfevaluative reactions to exerted behaviors. After personal standards have been set, incongruity between behavior and the standard against which it is measured activates self-evaluative reactions that in turn influence subsequent action (Bandura, 1986 (Bandura, , 1997 . This conceptual approach contr with negative feedback control models (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Kan 1977 ) and the goal-setting approach (Locke & Latham, 1990) , accordi which the absence of a discrepancy between standards and the resu behavioral action stops the motivational process, since effort tends reduced or, at best, maintained. According to Bandura (1986) , even if th is no incongruity between self-standards and present performance, will tend to set higher standards for themselves and "activate" futu haviors to satisfy new standards (cf. Kluger & DeNisi, 1996) .
Social Reinforcement
Social reinforcement includes the use of verbal consequences, typical expressed by individuals, such as attention, recognition, commendat compliments, and praise (e.g., Haynes et al., 1982) . Social reinforcers der their power from the following correlation of events. As Bandura ( noted, valuable material rewards often occur in conjunction with or foll ing the approval of others, and undesirable experiences tend to follow so disapproval. Social reactions, therefore, become predictors of future forcement, which in turn strengthens behaviors that result in social appr and weakens behaviors that lead to social disapproval. Thus, by reve the correlates, the reinforcement value of social consequences is der from their power to predict subsequent behaviors, rather than from the reactions themselves (Bandura, 1986) .
According to Bandura (1986) , several factors contribute to the effect ness of social reinforcement. First, the approval or disapproval of those have the authority and resources to administer rewarding or punishing sequences produces stronger effects than the approval or disappro those who have no power to subsequently provide any tangible rew Second, indiscriminate approval that does not eventually result in ma benefits becomes an empty reward, disapproval that is never followe aversive consequences becomes an empty threat, and both lack the poten to control human behavior. Third, social support that predicts severa comes has a greater reinforcing potency than support that relates to on single effect. Finally, because of both its intermittency and diverse cor lates, social reinforcement maintains its effectiveness even with minimal tangible support (Mowrer, 1960) .
The above theoretical discussion leads to several hypotheses, which we outline according to the progression of Hedges and Olkin's (1985) metaanalytic procedures:
Hypothesis 2. Each type of reinforcement intervention will produce significant average effects on task performance in both manufacturing and service organizations. Next, in view of the test for between-group homogeneity of effect sizes, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 3. Given their different reinforcing potentials, different reinforcement interventions will produce different average effect sizes in both manufacturing and service organizations.
Lastly, with regard to the test for the within-class homogeneity of effect sizes, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4. On the basis of their within-class unique sources of reinforcing potential, each type of reinforcement intervention will produce significant within-class homogeneity of average effects in both manufacturing and service organizations.
META-ANALYTIC MODERATOR ANALYSIS
The Coding of Studies Each study that met the selection criteria was coded for tw on the basis of the conceptual criteria outlined above. The t and their specific categories were: (1) type of organization and service) and (2) type of intervention (financial interventio cial intervention, social reward, and combinations of these three). We included the combinations of two or more types of reinforcement in the analysis for the sake of completeness since several studies simultaneously used different behavioral interventions. Data were coded independently by one of the authors and another trained rater. The values of the interrater agreement statistic (rho) were .96 and .98, respectively, for the moderator groups, and the mean agreement between raters when coding was aggregated across the moderator groups was a rho of .97. The "effective" reliability (R) was .99, indicating the probability that a similar group of two other raters would reach the same conclusions regarding the variables coded (Rosenthal, 1991) .
Analytical Procedures
According to Hedges and Olkin's (1985) meta-analytic method, three sets of statistical tests were necessary to determine whether the moderator or moderators adequately explained the nature of the moderation. First, we tested for the homogeneity of effect sizes within the two categories (manufacturing vs. service) of the first moderator group (type of organization) to determine whether this grouping variable adequately explained the studyby-treatment interaction found in the primary meta-analysis. For this test, we used the Hw homogeneity statistic (Hedges, 1982a (Hedges, , 1986 , which represents an overall test of the homogeneity of effect sizes within the partitioned groups across k studies. Second, we tested for the homogeneity of effect sizes between two categories of the first moderator to examine whether their respective average effect sizes significantly differed between each other, using the Hb homogeneity statistic (Hedges, 1982b (Hedges, , 1986 . We continued the process of subdividing and testing for within-and between-group fit according to the second moderator group (type of intervention) until within-group homogeneity with respect to effect magnitude was achieved. Finally, since we found that the effect sizes for final partitions were homogeneous within classes but heterogeneous between classes, we compared the effect sizes for different classes within each group by means of linear combinations using orthogonal polynomials (see Hedges and Olkin [1985] for a detailed discussion of these procedures).
Results of the Moderator Meta-Analysis
Type of organization. Using the type of organization as the first moderator, we split the original set of studies into two groups reflecting manufacturing and service organizations. Weighted average effect sizes for both manufacturing (d.1 = .96) and service organizations (d.2 = .37) were significant (p < .05), indicating the presence of a significant main effect for the O.B.
Mod. approach in each group. However, the average effect sizes varied significantly between the manufacturing and service groups (Hb = 90.54, p < .05), indicating that type of organization was a categorical variable significantly related to the magnitude of effect sizes. These findings supported Hypothesis 1. Further analysis indicated that individual effect sizes were also heterogeneous within each group (see Table 1 ), signaling that a significant treatment-by-study interaction was present in each group. To account for this interaction, we proceeded with second-level partitioning according to the second moderator that had been conceptually derived a priori, the type of reinforcement intervention.
Type of reinforcement intervention. Each of the initial two groups (manufacturing and service) were further partitioned into several classes according to the type of reinforcement intervention used in the studies. This moderator included seven categories: (1) financial interventions, such as money or valued prizes, (2) nonfinancial interventions, such as performance feedback, (3) social rewards, such as recognition and attention, (4) intervention package 1, the combination of 1 and 2, (5) intervention package 2, the combination of 1 and 3, (6) intervention package 3, the combination of 2 and 3, and (7) intervention package 4, the combination of 1, 2, and 3. Because the number of categories was relatively large, social rewards by themselves and intervention packages 1 and 2 were not represented in the manufacturing For manufacturing organizations, the average effect sizes (d.1i) were significant (p < .05) and homogeneous for these types of intervention: financial (d.1l = 1.36), nonfinancial (d.12 = 1.48), intervention package 3 (d.16 = 1.49), and intervention package 4 (d.17 = 1.82). Homogeneity was achieved both across the classes (Hwl = 15.94, p > .05) and within each class (see Table 2 ).
However, the average effect sizes for each type of intervention for manufacturing organizations were heterogeneous between classes (Hb = 600.82, p < .05), indicating a significant difference in their effect magnitudes. These Table 3 ). Significant between-class heterogeneity of average effect sizes (Hb = 564.70, p < .05) indicated that in service organizations, as in the manufacturing ones, different types of interventions produced different effects. These findings supported Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, pertaining to types of interventions in service organizations.
Type of organization and type of intervention. Since we calculated upper and lower confidence limits for every average unbiased effect size, corresponding to the specific combination of type of organization and type of intervention, the data lend themselves to a useful graphical presentation using a clustered side-by-side schematic plot that can further clarify the a Moderator codes for type of inter vention = 2, social rewards = 3, inte tion package 2 (1 and 3) = 5, interve and 3) = 7.
b X2 = d.2/v. for each class. c Within-class homogeneity statisti * p < .05 relationships analyzed (e.g., Light et al., 1994) . Figure 2 presents a schematic plot of average unbiased effect sizes for both the manufacturing (d.1i) and service organizations (d.2j), categorized by each type of intervention.
Orthogonal Comparisons among Classes
Since the average effect sizes for each initial moderator group produced varying between-class magnitudes, we used orthogonal polynomials (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) Findings from the primary meta-analysis also revealed study characteristics significantly moderated the relations application of O.B. Mod. and task performance. In evaluating the explanatory power of selected moderators, we found that the magnitude of the relationship between O.B. Mod. interventions and task performance significantly differed depending on the type of organization. Although in both manufacturing and service organizations, various O.B. Mod. interventions produced significant average effects, the average effect for manufacturing organizations was considerably stronger than that for service organizations. This finding indicates that the type of organization should be considered as an important contingency variable when behavioral management is applied. Overall, these results suggest the importance of initiating the development of a contingency approach to behavioral management. Thus, our findings suggest that the first step in this direction would be to recognize that, although behavioral management can produce significant effects in both manufacturing and service organizations, the larger impact tends to be in manufacturing organizations.
Reinforcement interventions in manufacturing organizations. The moderator analysis also revealed the presence of a significant treatment-bystudy interaction within both manufacturing and service organizations. Further partitioning of each group according to the second moderator-type of reinforcement intervention-indicated that for manufacturing organizations all four types of reinforcement interventions analyzed produced significant results. However, the magnitudes of the effects revealed different patterns of relationships between the types of O.B. Mod. interventions and task performance. For example, the simultaneous application of financial interventions, nonfinancial interventions, and social rewards (intervention package 4) produced the strongest effect. However, the effect magnitude of this combination intervention was not statistically different from that produced by nonfinancial interventions alone. Furthermore, the effect size for financial interventions alone was also not found to be significantly different from the one for nonfinancial interventions. Finally, microanalysis of comparison III provided additional evidence indicating nonfinancial contingencies as a source of significant increases in task performance.3
Reinforcement interventions in service organizations. As in manufacturing organizations, every type of reinforcement intervention analyzed for service organizations produced significant effects, which were also found to be significantly different among the different types of interventions. However, results for the service organizations revealed an interesting relationship between financial and nonfinancial interventions that appeared to be almost the opposite of the relationship of those two interventions in the manufacturing organizations. For instance, in the service organizations financial rewards produced a significantly stronger average effect than nonfinancial interventions. Moreover, nonfinancial interventions such as performance feedback produced the weakest (but still significant) results in the service organizations. A possible explanation for this finding may be that performance feedback in manufacturing organizations tends to be more specific, accurate, and immediate than it is in service organizations, where it is relatively ambiguous, typically more poorly defined, and subjective. However, when social rewards are used in combination with nonfinancial interventions such as performance feedback (intervention package 3), effects on performance significantly improve (see comparison VIII) even beyo though not statistically so) the effect produced by financial rewards al Regarding other types of reinforcement interventions in service or izations, although the effects of financial interventions were larger those of nonfinancial interventions, interestingly enough, they were n tistically different from those produced by social rewards. Another re ship emerged in comparison XV, in which, when compared to intervent package 4, intervention package 3 produced significantly stronger effe task performance. Uniquely enough, the only difference between these intervention packages was the addition of financial rewards in interven package 4. Thus, it appears that when financial rewards are used in c nation with nonfinancial contingencies such as performance feedbac social rewards, the monetary rewards may actually diminish the effect o whole intervention.
Limitations and Future Research
Several limitations of the current research deserve further consideration. First, although not generally recognized by reinforcement and be ioral theorists, it is quite plausible that, in addition to the examined gro variables, the relationship between O.B. Mod. applications and task pe mance may also be moderated by human judgmental processes (Band 1986). Since we could not have tested this assumption in this meta-an (because no study we examined accounted for such a possibility), w dress this potential limitation at the conceptual level. As Bandura (1 1997) simply pointed out, when "people have incomplete or erroneou formation about alternatives and their probable consequences, they proc information through cognitive biases, and what they value might be rat odd" (1986: 231). Also, besides basing their actions on the effects of i diate reinforcement, people may also act on their judgments of how they can perform the behaviors necessary to receive the consequen (Bandura, 1997) . In essence, expectations of personal inefficacy app likely to hinder an individual's coping behavior directed toward the cherished outcomes if the person doubts that he or she can do wh necessary to succeed, whereas a sense of high personal efficacy may sustain efforts even in light of uncertain outcomes (cf. Bandura, 1997; M dux, 1995 Manz & Sims, 1980 , 1981 , random reinforcement, self-generated rewards, and possible interaction effects between these variables and the reinforcing contingent consequencesmay provide a more thorough understanding of the complexities of human behavior in organizational settings.
Third, on a more methodological level, it is possible that an unknown moderator (or moderators) might be related to sample size or to the content of a sample, thus causing nonrandom sample selection error (Russell & Gilliand, 1995) . In this scenario, some screening or moderating process, rather than the moderator itself, operates to select certain types of subjects in a particular sample. Thus, besides the always-present possibility that sample differences might be due to the "true" impact of a certain moderator, differences in effect sizes between different samples might also be due to differences in the way the samples were composed (a moderating process). Since in meta-analyses moderator effects are detected through residual variances (e.g., Hedges and Olkin's [1985] x2-homogeneity-of-effect-sizes test, or Hunter and Schmidt's [1995] 75 percent rule), a moderator analysis can indicate the presence of a moderator effect, but it cannot determine any conceptual processes behind the effect (Russell & Gilliland, 1995) . Only primary research with random assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups can, so far, adequately resolve this problem (Cook & Campbell, 1977) . Addressing the complexities of nonrandom sampling error is an area in need of further methodological and conceptual development within the field of research synthesis.
Practical Implications
The results of this meta-analysis have several practical implications for managers who are interested in enhancing the performance of their employees in an efficient, inexpensive, and relatively simple manner. Two dimensions of our findings seem of particular importance: (1) understanding that, overall, the O.B. Mod. approach was found to have a significant positive effect on task performance and (2) understanding the contingent nature of the O.B. Mod. interventions. In line with the contingent aspect of the O.B. Mod. approach, we offer several specific recommendations for future practical applications.
First, O.B. Mod. produces stronger effects in manufacturing than in service organizations. In manufacturing organizations, intervention packages (simultaneous use of several types of reinforcement) and financial reinforcement both have significant effects, but they do not produce effects that are significantly different from those of nonfinancial interventions.
Thus, the use of nonfinancial interventions is recommended because it does not appear to be beneficial for the managements of these organizations to spend extra resources for financially based rewards (money or valued prizes) or to spend extra time and effort to apply intervention package 4, when the application of nonfinancial interventions alone basically produces the same results.
Second, in service organizations, financial reinforcers seem to result in significantly stronger effects than nonfinancial interventions. However, if social reinforcement is applied in combination with nonfinancial interventions (e.g., performance feedback), the effect magnitude increases slightly beyond that of the monetary rewards used alone. The practical contingency guideline in this case would be that in service organizations, as well as in manufacturing ones, there appears to be a favorable probability that the same positive effects (even slightly higher effects) on task performance can be obtained by applying nonfinancial-in this case, social-rewards, as opposed to costly financial interventions.
Overall, the major implication of these contingency guidelines is that, at least from a cost-benefit perspective, practitioners should more closely examine the natures of different behavioral interventions in both manufacturing and service organizations. We believe that the suggestions provided can serve as useful practical guidelines to help managers resolve the increasingly complex challenge organizations face now and in the future-increasing employee performance effectiveness without increasing costs.
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